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As is well known, Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion explains in-
vestors’ behavior in stock markets while Kimball’s measure of prudence
explains investors’ behavior when they make precautionary savings. What
is missing is a measure of investors’ tendency to buy options. In this paper
we show that cautiousness, which is equivalent to the ratio of prudence
to risk aversion, is the measure. We also discuss some properties of this
measure.
Introduction
Investors pursue three important financial activities, namely making savings,
buying equity, and trading derivatives. What can measure the strength of their
motive in doing these activities?
Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) developed the measure of risk aversion, which
is defined as the negative ratio of the second derivative to the first derivative of
a utility function. Pratt (1964) showed that the higher an investor’s measure
of risk aversion, the more risk premium he demands and the less investment he
makes in equity.
Leland (1968) and Kimball (1990) among some others investigated how to
measure the strength of an investor’s motive to make precautionary savings.
Kimball (1990) developed the measure of prudence, which is defined as the
negative ratio of the third derivative to the second derivative of a utility function.
The higher an investor’s measure of prudence, the more precautionary saving
he will make responding to a risk in his wealth.
An investor’s tendency to trade derivatives is more complicated to mea-
sure. Note when the measures of risk aversion and prudence are developed an
investor’s activities of making precautionary savings and buying stocks are s-
tudied separately. However, when deciding an investor’s optimal position in a
derivative it makes little sense if his position in the underlying equity is ignored.
Hence we cannot separate an investor’s activity in the derivative market from
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that in the underlying equity market. This is the reason that makes it difficult
to develop a measure of an investor’s tendency to trade derivatives.
In this paper, however, we show that the ratio of prudence to risk aversion
(minus one), measures an investor’s tendency to buy options. This measure
has long been called cautiousness though it is never explained if this is really a
measure of cautiousness.1 We show that an investor with higher cautiousness
has a stronger tendency to buy options. More specifically, if investor i’s lowest
coefficient of cautiousness is higher than j’s highest coefficient of cautiousness,
then investor j buys an option only if i does, and investor i sells the option
only if j does, regardless of their initial wealth, the interest rate, the underlying
stock price, the option price, and the distribution of the future stock price; and
the reverse is also true.
The idea to use cautiousness to explain the demand for options can be at-
tributed to Leland (1980). He used cautiousness to explain the convexity of an
investor’s optimal payoff function. However, we have two problems to use his
result to explain the demand for options. First, his result relies on an important
assumption that in an economy where investors have different constant positive
cautiousness the pricing representative investor also has constant cautiousness.
This is, as we will show in Section 5, not true. Second, in Leland’s framework,
an option buyer (seller) will buy (sell) all options with strike prices from zero
to infinity. This modeling is, of course, not ideal.
In this paper we also discuss the impact of background risk on an investor’s
cautiousness hence on his tendency to buy options. We show that if an in-
vestor has HARA class utility with positive cautiousness then when he has a
background risk, the cautiousness of his derived utility function will be strictly
higher, hence he will have a stronger tendency to buy options. This result can
be used to give a simple proof of Franke, Stapleton, and Subrahmanyam’s (here-
after FSS)(1998) main result. FSS (1998) investigated the impact of background
risk on investors’ optimal payoff functions in an economy in which investors have
identical positive constant cautiousness. They showed that in such an economy
the investors without background risk will have globally concave optimal payoff
functions. However, since they use the same framework as Leland, to go further
to explain the demand for options, they had to rely on the same notion of an
option buyer (seller) as Leland’s.
This paper is also related to Benninga and Blume (1985), Brennan and Cao
(1996), and Carr and Madan (2001). Benninga and Blume investigated the
optimality of a certain insurance strategy in which an investor buys a risky as-
set and a put on that asset. Brennan and Cao (1996) investigated the impact
of asymmetric information on the demand for options in an economy with ex-
ponential utility and normally distributed returns. They concluded that well
informed investors tend to buy options on good news and sell options on bad
news. Carr and Madan discussed how investors’ preferences and beliefs affect
their positions in derivatives.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section we introduce a
1See Wilson (1968).
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measure of investors’ preferences, which is called cautiousness. In the second
section we establish an ordering of utility functions by cautiousness and show
cautiousness is a measure of an investor’s tendency to buy options. In the third
section we discuss some properties of the above ordering of utility functions.
In the fourth section we discuss the impact of background risk on cautiousness
hence on an investor’s tendency to buy options. In the fifth section we discuss
the notion of increasing cautiousness. The final section concludes the paper.
1 Cautiousness
To introduce the concept of cautiousness we first have to explain the concepts
of risk aversion and prudence. Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) developed the
concept of risk aversion to explain investors’ behavior in the equity market.
As interpreted by Pratt (1964), given utility function u(x), the function R(x) =
−u′′(x)/u′(x) is a measure of risk aversion.2 The higher risk aversion an investor
has the larger risk premium he demands for a small and actuarially neutral risk.
Precisely, the risk premium demanded by an investor with utility u(x) will be
approximately the function R(x) times half the variance of the risk. It is also
shown to be a global measure of risk aversion in the sense that if the function
R(x) of an investor is always larger than that of the other, then the former will
demand a larger risk premium than the latter for any risk, large or small, at
any wealth level.
Kimball (1990) developed a theory regarding investors’ precautionary sav-
ings analogous to Pratt’s (1964) theory of risk aversion. Absolute prudence is
defined as P (x) = −u′′′(x)/u′′(x). The higher prudence an investor has, the
more equivalent precautionary premium he demands for a risk and the more
precautionary savings he makes in response to a risk in his wealth.
The first derivative of risk tolerance, where risk tolerance is the inverse of
absolute risk aversion, was called cautiousness by Wilson (1968)3. Given a
utility function, u(x), its cautiousness is C(x) ≡ (1/R(x))′ = (−u′(x)/u′′(x))′.
Equivalently it can be defined as the ratio of absolute prudence to absolute risk
aversion minus one. This can be shown as follows.
Given an increasing and concave utility function u(x), we have
(lnR(x))′ = (ln−u′′(x))′ − (lnu′(x))′ = −(P (x)−R(x))
which can be written as
R′(x) = −R(x)(P (x) −R(x)).
It follows that
(1/R(x))′ = −R′(x)/R2(x) = P (x)/R(x)− 1.
2Throughout this paper we assume all utility functions are strictly increasing, strictly
concave, and three times differentiable.
3See Wilson (1968).
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Thus we have C(x) = P (x)/R(x)− 1.
More explicitly we can write it as
C(x) = u′′′(x)u′(x)/u′′2(x) − 1.
Note that
(R(x))′ = −R2(x)(1/R(x))′ = −R2(x)C(x).
Thus decreasing absolute risk aversion (hereafter DARA) is equivalent to pos-
itive cautiousness and constant absolute risk aversion (hereafter CARA) is e-
quivalent to zero cautiousness.
It is well known that exponential utility functions have zero cautiousness
while other HARA utility functions have constant positive cautiousness. For
example, given a HARA utility function u(x) = (x + a)1−γ/(1 − γ), we have
C(x) = 1/γ.
Note in the rest of the paper, when we say increasing (decreasing) we mean
non-decreasing (non-increasing), and when we say higher (lower) we mean no
lower (no higher).
2 Measuring the Tendency to Buy Options
Assume a two-date economy with starting time 0 and ending time 1. Assume
there is a stock available in the market whose prices at time 0 and 1 are denoted
by S0 and S respectively. Assume there is a derivative written on the stock that
is traded in the market. Its payoff at time 1, c(S), is twice differentiable and
globally convex in S. Moreover, there exists at least one point, say S∗, at which
c(S) is strictly convex4. Denote its price at time 0 by c0. Assume there is
also a risk-free bond traded in the market; the risk-free interest rate is denoted
by r. S0, c0, and r are determined in the equilibrium of the economy. These
parameters are exogenously given in an individual investor’s investment problem
which we study in this paper.
Assume investors are indexed by i = 1, 2, ...; and they are all price-takers.
Investor i’s preference is represented by utility function ui(x). At time 0 he
has initial wealth w0i. Assume investor i invests xi in the stock and yi in the
derivative, and invests the rest money in the bond, which is w0i−xi−yi. Denote
investor i’s wealth at time 1 by wi(S;xi, yi). We have






For brevity we sometimes write wi(S;xi, yi) simply as wi(S).
4To guarantee that the investment problem does not degenerate, the distribution of S in
this paper always satisfies the condition that there exists  > 0, such that prob(S∗ −  < S <
S∗ + ) > 0.
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We obtain the first order conditions
Eu′i(wi(S))(S − (1 + r)S0) = 0, and Eu′i(wi(S))(c(S)− (1 + r)c0) = 0,
which can be written as
E[u′i(wi(S))S]
Eu′i(wi(S))
= (1 + r)S0, and
E[u′i(wi(S))c(S)]
Eu′i(wi(S))
= (1 + r)c0. (1)
The solutions of xi and yi depend on the utility function, S0, c0, the interest
rate r, the payoff of the derivative, and the distribution of S. We always assume
that the solutions of xi and yi exist.
Let Ri(x) denote the absolute risk aversion of ui(x), i.e., Ri(x) ≡ −u′′i (x)/u′i(x).
Let Ci(x) denote the cautiousness of ui(x), i.e., Ci(x) ≡ (1/Ri(x))′.











Before we proceed to present our main result, we first introduce a lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume two pricing kernels intersect twice. Taking the interest rate
and the spot stock price as given, the pricing kernel with fatter tails gives higher
prices of convex-payoff contingent claims wriiten on the stock.
Proof: See Huang (2004) or FSS (1999).
We now present our main result.
Proposition 1 The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a constant C ≥ 0 such that Ci(x) ≥ C ≥ Cj(x).
2. Investor j buys the derivative only if investor i does, and investor i sells
the derivative only if investor j does, regardless of their initial wealth, the
interest rate, the stock price, the derivative price, and the distribution of
the future stock price.
Proof: (1) ⇒ (2)
Note c(S) is twice differentiable and globally convex in S and there exists
at least one point at which c(S) is strictly convex. Thus investor j buys (sells)
the derivative if and only if for all S w′′j (S) ≥ (≤)0 and for at least one S
w′′j (S) > (<)0. Hence we need only to show that for all S w
′′
j (S) ≥ 0 and for
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at least one S w′′j (S) > 0 only if for all S w
′′
i (S) ≥ 0 and for at least one S
w′′i (S) > 0, and for all S w
′′
i (S) ≤ 0 and for at least one S w′′i (S) < 0 only if for
all S w′′j (S) ≤ 0 and for at least one S w′′j (S) < 0.
We have
E(φi(S)) = E(φj(S)) = 1
E(φi(S)S) = E(φj(S)S) = (1 + r)S0
and
E(φi(S)c(S)) = E(φj(S)c(S)) = (1 + r)c0
Applying Lemma 1, from the above equations we conclude that φi(S) and φj(S)
must intersect at least three times; otherwise the two pricing kernels, φi(S) and
φj(S), cannot give the same option price. It follows that δi(S) and δj(S) must
intersect at least twice. Hence 1/δi(S) and 1/δj(S) must intersect at least twice.
On the other hand, if investor i sells the derivative but investor j does
not, then we have for all S w′′i (S) ≤ 0 and for at least one S w′′i (S) < 0
while w′′j (S) ≥ 0. It follows that since there exists a constant C such that
Ci(x) ≥ C ≥ Cj(x), from (2), we have for all S ( 1δi(S) )′ ≥ ( 1δj(S) )′ and for
at least one S the inequality is strict. This implies that 1/δi(S) and 1/δj(S)
intersect at most once. This contradicts the previous assertion.
Thus investor i sells the derivative only if investor j does. Similarly we can
show that investor j buys the derivative only if investor i does.
(2) ⇒ (1)
We need only to show that if there does not exist a constant C such that
Ci(x) ≥ C ≥ Cj(x) then there is a set of wi0, wj0, S0, c0, r, and distribution of
S such that investor i optimally holds a short position in the derivative while j
does not.
Obviously when S0 is very low, both investors will buy the stock. When S0
rises investors will buy less stock. In particular, let S0 be close (but not equal)
to S0 ≡ E(S)1+r , which is the highest possible stock price in a risk averse world.
Similarly when c0 is very low, both investors will buy the derivative. When c0
rises, they will buy less the derivative. At some point investor j will not buy
neither sell the derivative. At this point if we manage to set up a set of wi0,
wj0, S0, c0, r, and distribution of S such that investor i optimally holds a short
position in the derivative then the proof is done. Note since S0 is close (but not
equal) to S0, we must have |xi|+ |yi| close (but not equal) to 0 and |xj |+ |yj |
close (but not equal) to 0.
Since there does not exist a constant C such that Ci(x) ≥ C ≥ Cj(x), that is,
for some x0 and y0, Ci(x0) < Cj(y0), then there is a neighborhood of x0, A, and
a neighbor hood of y0, B, such that for all x ∈ A and all y ∈ B, Ci(x) < Cj(y).
Let wi0 = x0/(1 + r) and wj0 = y0/(1 + r). Then for S0 sufficiently close (but
not equal) to S0, we must have almost probability one that wi(S) ∈ A and
wj(S) ∈ B.
This implies that for almost probability one Ci(wi(S)) < Cj(wj(S)). Hence













Since w′′j (S) = 0 we have w
′′
i (S) < 0, i.e., investor i sells the derivative while j
does not. Q.E.D.
The above result shows that if investor i’s lowest coefficient of cautiousness
is higher than j’s highest coefficient of cautiousness, then investor i always has
a stronger tendency to buy the derivative regardless of their initial wealth, the
interest rate, the stock price, the derivative price, and the distribution of the
future stock price; and the reverse is also true.
Although when deriving Proposition 1, we require that the derivative’s payoff
is not only convex but also twice differentiable, this result is valid to options
the payoffs of which are convex but not differentiable.
Corollary 1 Let the derivative be an option written on the stock. The following
two conditions are equivalent:
1. There exists a constant C such that Ci(x) ≥ C ≥ Cj(x).
2. Investor j buys the option only if investor i does, and investor i sells the
option only if investor j does, regardless of their initial wealth, the interest
rate, the stock price, the option price, and the distribution of the future
stock price.
Proof: Let the option be a call option with strike price K. Although the payoff
function of the option, c(S), is not differentiable, we can always construct a
series of derivatives which have convex and twice differentiable payoff function
cn(S), n = 1, 2, ..., such that cn(S) = 0, when S < K; cn(S) is increasing and
convex, when K ≥ S ≥ K + 1/n; cn(S) = S −K = c(S), when S > K + 1/n;
and the payoff function of the option is the limit of the series of payoff functions,
i.e., limn→∞ cn(S) = c(S).
Note that Proposition 1 is valid for the whole series of the derivatives. In
limit, it must be also valid for the option.
For a put option, the conclusion can be proved in the same way. Q.E.D.
The above result gives an ordering of utility functions in terms of the tenden-
cy to buy options. This ordering is not complete since not all functions can be
ordered in such a way. However, HARA class utility functions can be perfectly
ordered in such a way since they have constant cautiousness.
Note it is strong that we require one investor’s lowest coefficient of cautious-
ness is higher than j’s highest coefficient of cautiousness. The reason that we
need this strong condition is because we have to deal with the situation where
the investors have arbitrarily different optimal positions in the stock market and
the bond market.
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3 Properties of the Ordering of Utility Func-
tions
We have given an ordering of utility functions in terms of their cautiousness.
Utility functions can be ordered in such a way are of special interest when we
compare investors’ tendency to buy options. Note since HARA class utility
functions have constant cautiousness thus they are ideal candidates for this
purpose. Indeed we will see that this ordering of utility functions is closely
related to HARA utility functions. We have the following result.
Proposition 2
1. There exists a constant C ≥ 0 such that Ci(x) ≥ C ≥ Cj(x).
2. We have u′i(x) = t
−1/C(x), where t(x) is concave, and u′j(x) = s
−1/C(x),
where s(x) is convex, unless C = 0 and uj(x) is exponential.
Proof: Obviously if C = 0 then uj(x) must be exponential since it is DARA.






This can be rewritten as





Hence Ci(x) ≥ C is equivalent to t′′(x) < 0.
The result about uj(x) can be proved in the same way. Q.E.D.
Surely HARA utility functions are not the only utility functions can be
ordered in such a way. Assume there are a set of ordered utility functions; the
question is: do the popular operations on utility functions preserve the ordering?
Proposition 3 The operation u(x) :→ u(ax+b) preserves the ordering of utility
functions.
Proof: Let u1(x) and u2(x) are two of a set of ordered utility functions such













It follows that C1(ax + b) ≥ C ≥ C2(ax + b). Hence the ordering is preserved.
Q.E.D.
While the above operation completely preserve the ordering, some operations
may partially preserve it. For example, we have the following result.
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Proposition 4 If u1((x), u2(x), ..., un(x) all have cautiousness higher than a
constant then the cautiousness of
∑n
1 aiui(x) is also higher than the constant.
Proof: The general statement follows from the case u(x) = u1(x) + u2(x). For
this case,
C(x) =


















Suppose Ci(x) ≥ C, i = 1, 2, then







− 1 ≥ C.
Q.E.D.
We also have the following result.
Proposition 5 Given utility function u1((x) and u2(x), if they both have cau-
tiousness higher than constant C ≤ 0.5, then u(x) ≡ u1(u2(x)) also has cau-
tiousness higher than C; if they both have cautiousness lower than constant
C ≥ 0.5, then u(x) ≡ u1(u2(x)) also has cautiousness lower than C.
Proof: Let C(x) be the cautiousness of u(x). Then
C(x) =









where for brevity the argument of u2(x) is omitted. It can be written as
C(x) =















(u′′1 (u2)u′22 + u′1(u2)u′′2)2
− 1
If Ci(y) ≥ C, i = 1, 2, where C ≤ 0.5, then
C(x) ≥ (C + 1)u
′′2








− 1 = C
If Ci(y) ≤ C, i = 1, 2, where C ≥ 0.5, then

















(u′′1(u2)u′22 + u′1(u2)u′′2 )2
− 1 = C
Q.E.D.
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4 Impact of Background Risk
We have shown that cautiousness measures an investor’s tendency to buy option-
s. In this section we investigate the impact of background risk on an investor’s
cautiousness hence on his tendency to buy options. Given a utility function,
u(x), when there is a background risk , as usual, we call uˆ(x) = Eu(x+ ) the
derived utility function. We have the following result.
Proposition 6 Assume u(x) has cautiousness higher than a constant. Then
given a background risk, the cautiousness of the derived utility function will also
be higher than the constant.
Proof: We denote the background risk as , a random variable. Assume the
cautiousness of u(x) is higher than constant C. Let R(x) and P (x) be the risk
aversion and prudence of the utility function. Then we have P (x)/R(x) ≥ C+1.








P (x+ e1)P (x+ e2)
R(x+ e1)R(x+ e2)
≥ 2(C + 1) (3)
Rearranging the terms in (3), we have, for any e1 and e2,
u′′′(x+e1)u′(x+e2)+u′′′(x+e2)u′(x+e1) ≥ 2(C+1)u′′(x+e1)u′′(x+e2) (4)
Assuming e1 and e2 are independent and have identical distributions as  and
taking the expectation of (4) with respect to e1 and e2, we obtain
2E(u′′′(x+ ))E(u′(x+ )) ≥ 2(C + 1)(E(u′′(x+ )))2 (5)
Rearranging the terms in (5), we have Pˆ (x)/Rˆ(x) ≥ C+1, where Rˆ(x) and Pˆ (x)
are the risk aversion and prudence of the derived utility. Hence the cautiousness
of the derived utility, Cˆ(x) = Pˆ (x)/Rˆ(x) − 1 ≥ C. Q.E.D.
Corollary 2 Assume a utility function is HARA class with positive cautious-
ness. Given a background risk, the cautiousness of the derived utility function
will be strictly higher.
Proof: Note that a HARA utility function has constant cautiousness, say C. It
follows from Proposition 6 that the cautiousness of the derived utility function
is higher than C. Note in the proof of Proposition 6 the inequalities are strict
unless the utility function has constant R(x) and P (x), that is, it is power
utility which has zero cautiousness. Hence if a utility function is HARA class
with positive cautiousness then given a background risk, the cautiousness of the
derived utility function will be strictly higher. Q.E.D.
The above result shows that if an investor has HARA class utility with
positive cautiousness then when he has a background risk, the cautiousness of
his derived utility function will be strictly higher, hence he will have a stronger
tendency to buy options. This result can be used to give a simple proof of
FSS’s (1998) main result that in an economy in which investors have identical
constant positive cautiousness the investors without background risk will have
globally concave optimal payoff functions. The proof is shown in the appendix.
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5 Increasing Cautiousness
Huang (2000) showed that if the marginal utility of zero wealth is infinity then
increasing (decreasing) cautiousness implies decreasing (increasing) relative risk
aversion. Since decreasing relative risk aversion is more popularly accepted, so
should be increasing cautiousness. In the following we give another argumen-
t for increasing cautiousness. We show that when all investors have constant
cautiousness then the pricing representative investor will have increasing cau-
tiousness.
The framework used is similar to the one given by Leland (1980) and FSS
(1998). Assume in a one-period economy there are N investors and every in-
vestor’s wealth consists of a portfolio of state-contingent claims on the market
portfolio. Let X be the payoff of the market portfolio at the end of the period.
Assume that there is a complete market for state-contingent claims on X . Thus
all investors can buy and sell state-contingent claims on X so that, as discussed
in Leland (1980), any investor i can choose a payoff function xi(X). Let ui(x) be
investor i’s utility function. We assume that there exists a pricing kernel, φ(X),
whose functional form will be determined in the equilibrium of the economy.
Let wi0 be investor i’s initial endowment, expressed as the fraction of the
spot value of the total wealth in the economy. Let xi be his optimal payoff






E(φxi) = wi0E(φX). (7)
where E(.) denotes the expectation operator. In equilibrium, the market is
cleared, thus we have ∑
i
xi(X) = X. (8)
We have the first order condition
u′i(xi) = λiφ(X). (9)
Differentiating both sides of (9) will lead to the following result:
x′i(X) = Re(X)/Ri(xi), (10)
where Ri(x) = −u′′i /u′i(x) is investor i’s absolute risk aversion and Re(X) =
−φ′(X)/φ(X) is the pricing representative investor’s absolute risk aversion.
Differentiating both sides of (10), we obtain
x′′i (X) = R
2
e(X)[Ci(xi)− Ce(X)]/Ri(xi), (11)
where Ci(x) is investor i’s cautiousness and Ce(X) = (1/Re(X))′ is the pricing
representative investor’s cautiousness.
11
















We have the following result.
Proposition 7 Assume all investors have increasing cautiousness. Then the
pricing representative investor also has increasing cautiousness. Moreover, the
cautiousness of the pricing representative investor is strictly increasing unless
all investors have identical constant cautiousness.
Proof:
















It can be rewritten as:
x′′′i /x
′′
i = 2(Pe −Re) + (Pi −Ri)x′i + (C ′ix′i − C ′e)/(Ci − Ce),
where we have omitted the arguments of the functions. Applying (10) and (11)


































i − C ′e = 0.
Since C ′i ≥ 0, we have
C ′e ≥ 2Re(Pe −Re)
∑
i




From (13) we obtain
∑
i (Ci − Ce)/Ri = 0. Thus we have





Applying (12) and (13) we can rewrite it as







Rearranging the terms, we obtain










Applying the Cauchy inequality, we obtain C ′e ≥ 0. C ′e = 0 if and only if
Ci(x) = Cj(x) = C is a constant for any i and j. Q.E.D.
This shows if every investor has increasing cautiousness then so does the pric-
ing representative investor. As a special case, when every investor has constant
cautiousness we have the following corollary.
Corollary 3 Assume all investors have constant cautiousness. Then the pric-
ing representative investor has strictly increasing cautiousness unless all in-
vestors have identical constant cautiousness.
Proof: It directly follows from Proposition 7.
The above result shows clearly that if investors have different positive con-
stant cautiousness, then the pricing representative investor will not have con-
stant cautiousness. Instead he will have strictly increasing cautiousness.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have established that cautiousness, which is equivalent to the
ratio of prudence to risk aversion, is a measure of an investor’s tendency to buy
options. It is interesting to see that the measure of an investor’s tendency to buy
options is closely related to the measures of risk aversion and prudence which
explain investors’ activities in the bond market and stock market. Regarding
the latter two activities, it is now widely accepted that investors should have
decreasing absolute risk aversion while Kimball (1993) proposed decreasing ab-
solute prudence. It is also said that investors are more likely to have decreasing
relative risk aversion. As Huang (2000) showed that increasing (decreasing)
cautiousness implies decreasing (increasing) relative risk aversion given that
marginal utility of zero wealth is infinity, then increasing cautiousness may be
more likely.
An investor’s cautiousness can only tell if he has a stronger tendency to
buy options than others. However, if two investors both buy options, their
coefficients of cautiousness cannot tell if one buys more options than the other.
We have also showed that background risk will increase the cautiousness of
HARA class utility. Further research will be interesting to show the impact of
background risk on the cautiousness of a general utility function.
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Appendix A Proof of Theorem 3 in FSS (1998)
In the economy is described in Section 5, we have the following result.
[Theorem 3, FSS (1998)] Assume all investors have identical positive
constant cautiousness and some investors have uninsurable back-
ground risk. Then the investors without background risk have con-
cave optimal payoff functions.
Proof: Assume all investors have identical positive constant cautiousness C.
When investor i is exposed to background risk i, the utility function ui(xi) in
the utility maximization problem (6) is replaced by the indirect utility function
uˆi(xi) = Ei(ui(xi+ i)). Thus on the right hand side of (13) Ci(xi) is replaced
by the cautiousness of investor i’s derived utility function, Cˆi(xi), if investor i
has background risk. For the investors without background risk, Ci(xi) = C is
a positive constant.
From Corollary 2, we know that for every investor i who has background
risk, Cˆi(xi) > C. Thus from Equation (13), we easily verify that the pric-
ing representative investor’s cautiousness is strictly higher than those of the
investors without background risk. From (11) the optimal payoff functions of
those without background risk are strictly concave. Q.E.D.
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